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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a measure of the Canadian condition that a symposium devoted
to "Canadian Legal Scholarship: Its Past and Prospect" should consist
o Copyright, 1985, Roderick A. Macdonald.
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J.E.C. Brierley and G.B. Baker for their bibliographical insights, as well as their helpful comments
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in classical civil law style and would like to thank the editors of the Journal for indulging most
of my efforts to achieve a coherence of form and substance.
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of thirteen papers covering everything from international law to feminist
law, but should have only one study devoted to 'the civil law'. Just as
authors of treatises on such subjects as debtor-creditor law, trusts or
mechanics liens feel justified in adding the phrase "in Canada" to the
title of their works merely because they discuss in a brief final chapter
'execution of judgments in Quebec', 'the trust in Quebec' or 'construction
privileges in Quebec', so too it would seem that this Symposium qualifies,
by virtue of the present essay, as a 'Canadian' endeavour.
The purpose in raising this issue is not again to decry the continuing
ignorance of civil law and French-language scholarship displayed in
Canada's common law jurisdictions., Rather, it is to illustrate the
difficulties with delimiting the mandate of a Quebec civilian at this
conference. Unlike most other symposium topics (which can be more
or less defined per genus et differentiam within the conceptual structure
of the law itself), the topic of this essay does not easily lend itself to
discrete treatment, and in fact has the potential to overlap with most
other topics. For example, my co-symposiasts justifiably might consider
that I would cover all scholarship either originating in Quebec, or written
in the French language, or dealing with matters proper to the Civil Code
of Lower Canada.
Hence, those panelists addressing property, torts, contracts and family
law might well feel, in principle, dispensed from considering non-common-
law scholarship. But, if such a view is taken, who will be examining
Quebec (and French-language) scholarship as it relates to federal aspects
of family law, contract and consumer law, property and environmental
law, and so on? And who will review this same scholarship in the areas
of criminal law, corporation law, constitutional law or taxation law? Such
are only a few of the problems of a bilingual and legally bicultural country.
Rather than leave it to others to determine the scope of this study,
I have selected three criteria for defining the topic. These, no doubt,
would be adopted by other Quebec civilians in similar circumstances.
First, a systemic criterion has been applied. The proposition that every
legal system has its proper genius and internal logic presumably is
I This state of affairs has been well documented in the Arthurs Report. See Consultative Group
on Research and Education in Law, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Law and
Learning (Chair H.W. Arthurs) (1983) at 138, 155. See also . Desch~nes, "On Legal Separatism
in Canada" (1978) 12 L.S.U.C. Gazette 1. I do not wish to find fault with the organizers of the
symposium, who expended substantial energy (without great success) attempting to induce civilian
and francophone professors to participate.
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uncontroversial. Just as the distinction between law and equity played
a significant role in pre-fusion, Anglo-Canadian legal systems, so too
the distinction between public law and private law is one of the
fundamental organizing tools of the modem civil law tradition.2 While
this distinction has little bearing (and perhaps even less meaning) in
common law jurisdictions, it continues to have a significant effect on
conceptions of legal scholarship in Quebec. All academic commentary
not relating to private law matters (Le., on criminal law, administrative
law, constitutional law, municipal law, etc.) has, therefore, been excluded
from this survey.3
The second criterion flows from Canada's constitutionally divided
legislative jurisdictions. The existence of federal statutory law, frequently
grounded in common law assumptions and drafted in the manner of
a common law statute, also has led many Quebec professors who teach
the private law subjects to view these federal enactments as foreign to
their research endeavours. The Interest Act is not thought to form an
essential part of the law of civil obligations (contract, quasi-contract,
delict); the Bank Act is seen as a mere appendix to the law of privileges
and hypothecs (secured transactions); and the Bankruptcy Act is rarely
analysed as part of the procedural law relating to the execution of
judgments (debtor-creditor relations). Even the Divorce Act sometimes
rates little more than a cameo appearance in civil law treatises and
monographs on matrimonial property law. In consequence, the orthodox
perspective that federal law is not really a part of the basic private law
of Quebec has been adopted.4
The third criterion flows from perceptions about the nature of a
Civil Code. Most private law scholars in Quebec view all non-codal
legislation as a derogation from the 'droit commun' which is (and ought
to be) contained solely in the Civil Code. Even such provincial statutes
such as the Adoption Act, the Special Corporate Powers Act and the
Consumer Protection Act sometimes are not seen as bona fide objects
2 For a brief review see J.H. Merryman, "The Public Law - Private Law Distinction in European
and American Law" (1968) 17 J. Public Law 3, and R. Savatier, Du droit civil au droit public,
2e 6d. (1950). Compare C. Harlow, "'Public' and 'Private' Law: Definition Without Distinction"
(1980) 43 Mod. L. Rev. 241
3 Let me emphasize that the public/private distinction is, even in civil law countries, largely
conventional. For example, in France the criminal law is seen as a subset of private law, whereas
in Quebec, to my knowledge, no scholar views criminal law as a private law subject.
4 For a particularly forceful critique of this, and related, positions, see J.-G. Belley, "La throrie
grn~rale des contrats. Pour sortir du dogmatisme" (1985) 26 C. de D. 1045.
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of private law research.s Thus, a voluminous scholarship relating to Quebec
private law statutory enactments has also been left aside.
This paper embraces these basic conceptual distinctions made by
mainstream Quebec private lawyers, with the result that its scope is limited
to the private civil law per se as reflected in the Civil Code.6 In classical
civilian fashion, this study is divided into two main sections: the theory
of civil law scholarship in Quebec and, the practice of civil law scholarship
in Quebec.7 The former section considers how civil law scholars themselves
view their research endeavours, and the latter reviews the product of
civil law research since 1775, concluding with a prognosis for private
law scholarship in Quebec over the next twenty years.
Before these topics are examined in greater detail, three points bear
emphasis. First, continental civil law writers are currently debating the
role of scholarship (1a doctrine) in their legal systems. Yet, the local impact
of this debate is difficult to measure, for there is no easy transposition
of continental perspectives into Quebec. Here, scholars tend to adhere
to a more stylized view of academic writing which reflects the particular
preoccupations of civil law North America.
Second, I may not be the most apt spokesman for the private civil
law scholarly community. A preoccupation with maintaining the integrity
of their tradition leads some Quebec professors to consider me not to
be a true civilian. Not only do I have a common law training as well
as a civil law training, but I also have taught and continue to be interested
in public law subjects.
Third, in Quebec there tends to be a greater divergence in scholarly
traditions among various branches of the law than is found elsewhere.
The observations which follow should not, therefore, be taken as re-
presentative of all French-language or Quebec-based legal research. They
concern only private civil law scholarship as defined in this introduction,
whether written in French or in English.
s For a plea to put this 'extraneous' material back into the Civil Code, where it can then
be properly studied and researched as a field of 'private law', see P.-A. Cr6peau, "Civil Code
Revision in Quebec" (1974) 34 La. L. Rev. 921. Surprisingly, a similar viewpoint is often expressed
by common law scholars. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law For the Age of Statutes (1982).
6 The survey also covers general studies of the Civil Code, the codification movement and
the judicial process.
7 This is not meant to be a critical allusion. Common law scholars often forget the extent
to which intellectual form shapes substance. Civil law scholars in Quebec invariably attempt to
write on the French two-Part 'Plan' model. For an elaboration of the features (and claimed virtues)
of this mode of writing see H. Mazeaud, Nouveau Guide des Exercises pratques (1961) at 78 et
seq.
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II. THE THEORY OF CIVIL LAW SCHOLARSHIP IN QUEBEC
Every legal tradition has a particular view of the role of scholarly
commentary as a source of legal justification. When examined from inside
the system, legal scholarship is seen to perform different functions in
the civil law than in the common law. In other words, apart from law-
related writing originating in disciplines other than law (philosophy,
history, economics, political theory, sociology, anthropology), all legal
scholarship will be shaped by systemic presuppositions. As a result, any
evaluation of civil law scholarship must be preceded by a few general
observations about the civil law tradition.8
In continental civil law jurisdictions, as well as in Quebec, most
theorists regard classical legal scholarship (1a doctrine) as a 'secondary
source of law'. Even though academic commentary no longer has the
exalted position of the jus respondendi of Roman law, in contemporary
civil law theory it nevertheless has a status about equal to that of precedent
(la jurisprudence).9 Scholarly opinion is not simply writing about law;
it is, in some measure, thought to be constitutive of law. In this section
an attempt is made to discover why this should be the case, and to
assess what influence this enhanced role of la doctrine has had upon
the legal private law scholarship to be found in civilian jurisdictions.
There are three features of the Quebec civil law tradition which
contribute to the special role which legal scholarship plays, and to the
form which most scholarly writing takes. These features are the existence
of a Civil Code, the style of judgments and the theory of law embraced
by most private law scholars. Each requires brief elaboration before a
general theory of civil law scholarship may be deduced.
8 See J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, 2d ed. (1985); A. Watson, The Making of the
Civil Law (1981); and K.W. Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil Law (1962).
9 At least on the traditional view. See J. Carbonnier, Droit civil 9e dd. (1972) t. I A la p.
136; H. Mazeaud, Legons de droit civil 4e & (1967) t. 2, no. 99 a la p. 123; A. Weill & F.
Terr6, Droit civil Introduction gjnirale, 4e 6d. (1979) no. 229 A la p. 245; R. David & J.E.C. Brierley,
Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 2d ed. (1978) at 94-141; Y. Loussouar, "The Relative
Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and Precedent in French Law" (1958) 18 La. L.
Rev. 235.
However, certain modern authors deny any such role to la doctrine, relegating it to a position
of influence only. See J. Ghestin & G. Goubeaux, TraitJ de droit civiL Introduction gintrale 2e
dd. (1982) t. 1, no. 227 A la p. 187-9.
For the position in Quebec see L. Baudouin, Les aspects giniraux du droitprivd dans la province
de Quibec (1967) A la p. 89-98; D. Turp & J. Leavy, Sources et mtithodologie du droit qubtcois
et canadien (1981) A lap. 483-6; P. Azard, "Le problme des sources du droit civil dans ]a province
de Qudbec" (1966)44 R. du B. Can. 417 a lap. 430; A. Popovici, "Dans quelle mesure lajurisprudence
et la doctrine sont-elles source de droit au Qu6bec?" (1973) 8 RJ.T. 189; P.-G. Jobin, "Les rdactions
de la doctrine A la crdation du droit civil qu6brcois par lesjuges: les d6buts d'une affaire de famille"
(1980) 21 C. de D. 257; R.A. Macdonald, "La doctrine: source de droit administratif qudb6cois?"
(1984) 29 McGill LJ. 340.
Again, certain Quebec authors contest this enhanced role of la doctrine. See P. Azard & A.F.
Bisson, Droit civil quidbdcois (1971) t. 1, no. 27 a la p. 37.
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A. La loi: The Impact of Codification
Perhaps the best way of illustrating the problem of civil law
scholarship in general, without having to review the 'to codify or not
to codify' debatelo is to ask common lawyers for an assessment of the
status of academic commentary in their own legal culture., In particular,
one might inquire .how much analytical scholarship in the common law
is required merely to reconcile various judges' rulings on disputes presented
to them.,2
For a civilian at least, much scholarly effort in common law
jurisdictions seems to have been devoted, over the past century, to little
more than writing integrated prfcis upon judicial decisions. The object
of this scholarship has been to reduce a number of lengthy appellate
court judgments to relatively canonical formulae. Of course, these
formulae are not alleged to be immutable statements of legal normativity.
Courts change their minds and so do legal scholars. Moreover, these
formulae may be drafted at different levels of abstraction. The more
abstract the formulation of a legal rule, the more permanent it is likely
to be. The more permanent the rule, the more canonical it will be. However,
even at its best, analytical writing in the common law tradition is
unselfconsciously descriptive, in that it is focused on explaining or
rationalizing judicial speculations ahistorically. Both the exemplification
of, and justification for, the formulae so derived are most often found
in the judgments themselves.
By contrast, the derivation and elaboration of canonical formulae
is rarely the object of civil law scholarship. Instead, academic commentary
focuses on arguing for the appropriateness of codal texts (justification)
and, to a lesser degree, on fleshing out their implications in particular
cases (exemplification). For this reason civil law analytical scholarship
tends to be more systematic, rationalistic and prescriptive.
10 This, after all, is a false debate since there are both uncodified civil law jurisdictions -
Scotland, South Africa, Sri Lanka - and codified common law jurisdictions - California, Montana,
Israel. Besides, the issue is not the substance of private law but rather its form and presentation.
See most recently, Watson, supra, note 8; C.M. Cook, The American Codification Movement (1981);
G. Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions (1981); and R.W. Gordon,
Book Review (1983) 36 Vand. L.R. 431. For ease of expression in this essay, however, I will
use the term common law to mean uncodified private law, and the term civil law to mean codified
private law.
" For thorough, and sympathetic studies see G.W. Paton & D.P. Derham, Jurisprudence, 4th
ed. (1972) at 203-69; Patterson, Jurisprudence. Men and Ideas of the Law (1953) at 217-23.
12 See, for attempts to deal with this question, A.W.B. Simpson, "The Rise and Fall of the
Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature" (1981) 48 U. Chi. L.R. 632;
D. Kennedy, "Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical
Legal Thought in America 1850-1946" in Research in Law and Sociology, vol. 3 (1980), at 3
(3 volumes); A.W.B. Simpson, "The Legal Treatise and Legal Theory" in E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester,
eds., Law, Litigants and the Legal Profession (1983).
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One might oversimplify the point for emphasis by contrasting the
epistemological basis of the common law with that of the civil law in
the following manner. In systems of uncodified private law, judgments
primarily provide decisions and reasons, but not norms; in systems where
private law is codified the code establishes norms but, in principle, does
not decide cases or give justifications. Because the code purports to
announce legal norms, it has a much greater capacity to structure scholarly
discourse and to set the agenda for all types of legal research, especially
where commentators subscribe to a version of legal positivism. Moreover,
the very existence of a code of private law promulgated by a national
government (in other words, the identification of even private law with
state activity) is an inducement to legal positivism.3
These last points can be best illustrated through an example of how
codal interpretation has proceeded. Article 2022 C.C. provides: "Move-
ables are not susceptible of hypothecation; except as provided in the
titles Of Merchant Shipping and Bottomry and Respondentia." Leaving
aside the exclusion established by the second clause, the text means much
more to a civil law scholar than a mere prohibition of hypothecs over
moveables. In the past, it has meant no less than that, as a general rule,
a creditor cannot take any type of non-possessory security in moveables.
Why should this be the case? Primarily, because the article im-
mediately leads back to other codal texts, which seem to preclude such
security devices. The most important of these other texts are articles
2092 C.C. and 2268(1) C.C., which, by implication, provide that
possession amounts to ownership in the law of moveable property; articles
1980-1982 C.C., which stipulate that privileges and hypothecs are the
only preferences obtainable upon a debtor's property; article 1994 C.C.,
which stipulates that a pledge (pawn) is the only consensual privilege
which can be taken over moveables; and article 1966 C.C., which requires
debtor dispossession for a valid pawn. 4
13 See Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra, note 9 at 1-116, and esp. at 24-8. See also J.H. Merryman,
supra, note 8, chapters IV, X, XIX and XX, as well as infra, section II, C.
14 Of course, each of these other articles demands a similar exercise in correlation. Codal
articles speak to each other in the manner of common law judgments, not in the manner of ordinary
statutes. See J. Vining, Authoritative and the Authoritarian (1986) for an elaboration of this point.
An excellent example of the research agenda implied by this feature of codes is the recent
volume published by the Quebec Centre of Private and Comparative Law entitled The Key Words
in Context (KWIC) of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (At 1 April 1984) (1985). This monograph
is a comprehensive compilation of each usage of terms - ranging from the legal (eg. revendication)
to the secular (eg. made) - in every article of the Civil Code. While few common lawyers would
claim that the usage of the word "employment" in an Employment Standard Act necessarily shapes
its meaning in the Family Law Reform Act, no civil lawyer would deny that the usage of that
term in the chapter of the Code relating to the "lease of services" bears directly on its meaning
in the chapter of the Code relating to "support obligations".
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A second reason why article 2022 C.C. for so long was understood
as a prohibition on non-possessory security devices in moveables is because
a code gives the illusion of completeness.,5 Since no codal article explicitly
alludes to modem security mechanisms and techniques, commentators
have held that such security devices do not and cannot exist.
Recently, however, some scholars have argued that article 2022 C.C.
permits conditional sales, leases and other debtor-in-possession title-
security. They assert that since the Code speaks only of preferences on
a debtor's own property, the creditor surely can use title itself as a security
device. While the jurisdiction for such a modified view might well have
been grounded in economics, social theory or philosophy, it is in fact
found by scholars in analogies to the right of redemption set out in articles
1545 et seq. C.C., and in the resurrection of the Roman law concept
of fiducia, as a third form of security, to be deployed along with pignus
(pledge) and hypotheca (hypothec). The rediscovery offiducia legitimates
a re-interpretation of the codal articles noted earlier and supports recourse
to the right of redemption analogy.16
One sees from this example that, even though the Code sets out
no justification for its norms, it ordains the mode of intelligible analysis.
The Code tells scholars the language they are entitled to speak, even
if within that language a variety of arguments is possible. Too often
a code is permitted to assume its own legitimacy and ahistoricity. Of
course, a codal structure does not necessarily mean that legal scholarship
must be restricted to the reporting of, and exegesis upon, its texts, but
to the extent it demands primary intellectual allegiance to its own puzzles,
codified law can be viewed as an intellectual 'why-stopper'.1
In the exercise of cross-referencing legal norms it is apparent how
codes shape academic writing, and how academic writing shapes legal
meaning. Legal scholarship controls the justifiatory structure of canonical
,5 Shortly after Napoleon's codification, which was intended to suppress pre-revolutionary law,
an eminent French jurist was reported to have said: "I know nothing of the civil law; I know
only the Code Napoldon." Today such a view is less popular as jurists begin to acknowlege a
law behind a Code. See R. David, French Law (1972), c.5. See also R.A. Macdonald, "Pour la
reconnaissance d'une normativitdjuridique implicite et inferentielle" (1986) 18 Sociologue et socidtds
47.
16 For a detailed discussion of this evolution see R.A. Macdonald, "Privileges and Other
Preferences Upon Moveable Property in Quebec: Their Impact Upon the Rights and Recourses
of Execution Creditors" in M.A. Springman & E. Gertner, eds., Debtor-Creditor Law: Practice and
Doctrine (1985), c. VII.
17 See S. Herman, "From Philosophers to Legislators, and Legislators to Gods: The French
Civil Code as Secular Scripture" [1984] U. Ill. L. Rev. 597. The same point, for slightly different
reasons, can be made about common law scholarship. The German jurist Rudolph Sohm once
said: "A rule of law may be worked out either by developing the consequence that it involves,
or by developing the wider principles that it presupposes." Codified law can become a 'why-stopper'
in the latter sense; uncodified law a 'why-stopper' in the former sense.
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texts, and stipulates the extensions to which they may be taken.,s When
legal commentators exalt the canons of a code as exclusive, and do not
pursue legal justification beyond those texts (to history, economics,
philosophy or anthropology), their scholarship overemphasizes the ex-
emplificatory role of civil law conceptual analysis and gives short shrift
to its justificatory role. The paradox is that a legal culture of codification
requires (and authorizes) fundamental conceptual analysis, while at the
same time facilitating the production of inadequate legal scholarship.
B. La jurisprudence: The Style of Judgments
Closely related to observations about the influence of codification
on scholarship is the question of how the style of judicial opinion writing
shapes academic endeavours. In other words, to what extent does the
form of judicial justification, independent of its subject-matter, call forth
identifiable scholarly responses? No doubt, judgments laced with eco-
nomic jargon will typically produce commentary from economists and
jurists with a predisposition to economic analysis, just as decisions with
extensive citations to philosophical works will often stimulate philosophers
and philosophically minded legal scholars. For similar reasons, judgments
argued solely in terms of analytical rhetoric will encourage and legitimate
conceptual analysis.
Yet, a more important point here goes to the root theory of
adjudication in a given legal tradition. The distinctions which Karl
Llewellyn drew between the "grand style" and the "formal style" of
opinion writing are not quite on point in this context.9 To an outsider,
both characterizations are born of distinctively common law methodol-
ogies. Nor are differentiations between the judicial treatment of the
common law (droit commun) of a jurisdiction and judgments relating
to legislative exceptions and special cases particularly & propos.2o A
relatively uniform system-based methodology is pursued regardless of
18 For a detailed discussion of this point see Atias, "Le pouvoir des ides en droit civil" in
Connaissancepolitique (1983) at 113; "La controverse doctrinale dans le mouvement du droit priv"
(1983) 8 R. de la recherche juridique 427.
19 K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Traditiorn Deciding Appeals (1960). Nevertheless, the affinities
between continental appellate judgments and those common law decisions Llewellyn would
characterize as written in the formal style, should not be neglected.
20 The term "common law (droit commun)" here is used to refer to the basic private law
of a jurisdiction, whether this finds expression in a series of judicial decisions or in a Code.
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whether the area under examination is controlled by common law
principles (principes de droit commun) or by a statute.2'
Instead, one must focus upon differences in the process of judicial
justification in common law and civil law jurisdictions. In this connection
the salient features of common law judicial methodology bear emphasis.22
First, because the common law decision reflects a post hoc rationality
springing from an actual controversy, it displays, to use Max Weber's
expression, a "lower systemic rationality" than a civil law decision; it
is, therefore, less capable of being captured by a single syllogistic
articulation as part of a larger normative system.23 Second, a common
law decision typically contains an amorphous co-mingling of the rule
announced and the reasons for the rule; the rule is normally given in
two or three different formulations in the same judgment, often at
progressive levels of abstraction, and by reference to different criteria
of justification.2, Third, the explanation of the rule and the rule reflected
in the decision may differ; the import of the judgment, therefore, must
always be greater than as a mere exemplification of the principle it
applies.25 By contrast, because of theories of a division of jurisdiction
between judge and legislator (as reflected in the codification phenomenon
itself), and theories of legal science (as reflected in a conception of legal
interpretation), the archetypal continental civil law decision evinces none
of these attributes.26 An example will illustrate this point. What follows
is a recent, randomly selected arret - notice that the term is notjugement
(judgment) - from the highest appellate court in France, the Cour de
cassation.
21 Judicial responses to codifying statutes such as the P.P.S.A. more than illustrate the point
as far as common law systems are concerned. See the detailed discussion in J.S. Ziegel, "Recent
and Prospective Developments in the Personal Property Security Law Area" (1985) 10 Can. Bus.
L.. 131.
22 For further elaboration see L.L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (1968) at 84-112.
23 The recent history of restitution is a classic example of this point. See S. Hedley, "Unjust
Enrichment as the Basis of Restitution - An Overworked Concept" (1985) 5 Leg. Stud. 56, for
a flavour of the characterization and systemization conundrums of the common law.
24 It is this impalpability of common law rules which so delights aggressive practitioners of
'Socratic' teaching, and generates jokes about teachers who find the ratio of a case in "the first
clause of the third sentence of the second paragraph on page 'x' of the concurring reasons of
Justice Y."
25 Hence, the common lawyer's preoccupation with discoversing how to determine the ratio
of a case. For a civilian, a delightful example of this obsession is A.R. Cross, Precedent in English
Law, 3d ed. (1979).
26 Max Weber constructs a table on two axes to differentiate legal systems. First, they may
be either rational or irrational; second, they may be either substantive or formalistic. An irrational/
substantive system is that of cadijustice. An irrational/formal system is that of oracles. A rational/
substantive system is a theocracy. And a rational/formal system is that of modem western law,
such as the civil law. On this typology common law systems tend to be both less rational and
less formal than civil law systems, and by definition verge closer to systems of cadi justice. See,
for a summary, A.T. Kronman, Max Weber (1983), c. 4.
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Cie. D'assurance La Concorde et autre v. Kedvbs et autres
22 fdv. 1985; 2e Ch. civ.
LA COUR: Sur le moyen unique, pris en ses deux branches; - Attendu, selon
l'arrat confirmatif attaqu6 (Lyon, 22 oct. 1982), que M. Kedv~s, circulant A bicyclette
dans une agglomdration, a td bless6 dans sa chute provoqude par l'irruption d'un
chien sur la chaussde; qu'il a assign6 en rdparation de son prdjudice en tant que
gardien de l'animal, la Soc. Sicaworms et son assureur, la compagnie La Concorde;
que la caisse mutuelle rdgionale du Rh6ne et le Fonds de garantie automobile
sont intervenus A l'instance; - Attendu qu'il est fait grief a l'arrrt d'avoir condamn6
la Soc. Sicaworms et son assureur A rdparer, par l'application de l'art. 1385 c.
civ., le dommage subi par M. Kedvs alors, d'une part, que s'agissant d'une personne
morale, la garde de l'animal, 6tranger A son objet social, n'aurait pu s'exercer
que par l'intermddiaire d'un prdpos6 d~sign6 ou autorisd A cet effet par son
commettant, et que la cour d'appel n'a pas constat6 l'existence d'une telle autorisation
d'ailleurs ddnide par la socid6t, alors, d'autre part, que l'arr&t en ddduisant qu'elle
aurait tol6r le geste de piti6 des membres non ddnommds de son personnel pour
un animal sans utilit6 pour I'entreprise, n'aurait pas caracteris6 ladite garde;
Mais attendu que l'arr~t relive que l'animal se trouvait depuis de nombreux
mois a l'intdrieur de l'enceinte des dtablissements Sicaworms oi il avait 6t6 aperqu
t plusieurs reprises A l'attache dans la cour, que de ces constatations la cour d'appel
a pu d6duire que, quelle que ffit l'utilit6 de l'animal pour l'exercise de ses activitds,
la Soc. Sicaworms avait sur celui-ci, au moment de l'accident, les pouvoirs de
contr6le, de direction et d'usage qui caractdrisent la garde; d'oii il suit que le
moyen n'est pas fond6;
Par ces motifs, rejette.
It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court of Canada would decide a
common law case of corporate personality and dog-owners' liability in
such a summary fashion.
What does all this have to do with the style of legal writing? Quite
simply, if decisions of the Cour de cassation are primarily exemplifications
of codal texts, then academic commentary (1a doctrine) must be the
repository of analysis and critical evaluation of legal norms. Scholarly
writing presumptively is the locus of reformulation, reassessment and
justification of legal rules - a task which, in common law jurisdictions,
is undertaken in the first instance by judges. Thus, while it is quite
appropriate for common lawyers to claim that "ourjudges are ourjurists"27
such a view completely misconceives the folkloric role of the continental
civil law judge. In fact, the original characterization of the Cour de
cassation as a governmental organ responsible to the legislature and
designed to casser (quash) incorrect decisions by lower courts, so that
legislative control over legal normativity is preserved, reflects the con-
ception of "judicial decision as only exemplification." The professional
division of labour in continental civil law countries between the notary,
27 See J.P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (1968). This is also said of Quebec judges, for
reasons to be detailed in the next paragraph.
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the advocate, the law teacher and the judge - a division which is imposed
from the moment of law-school graduation - also contributes to a more
well-defined division of literary labour as between the authors of la
jurisprudence and la doctrine.
Although the Quebec Civil Code is a fair reflection of the French
Code Napoleon, 28judicial decisions in Quebec rarely resemble those of
continental courts. The federal, bisystemic and bicultural character of
the Quebec legal tradition contributes, even when purely private civil
law cases are considered, to judgments being rendered in a form more
typical of common law decisions.29 Unfortunately, however, given the
fixed canons of the Code, the common law judgments which these private
law decisions resemble usually are not those of Llewellyn's "grand style",
for exactly the reasons Llewellyn highlighted.30 In other words, many
private law decisions in Quebec formally look like common law judgments
but substantively seem to imitate the continental ant.31
The impact of such a jurisprudence is not difficult to predict: some
Quebec private law scholarship shows a great formal affinity to French
academic commentary, but substantively resembles common law con-
ceptual analysis.2 This writing, regrettably, reflects the worst of both
worlds, since it leaves unexplored the justifications for legal norms, and
is content with minor reformulation and restatements of codal rules,
complemented by jejune attempts at exemplification.33
While the style of civil law judgments ought to call forth a more
sophisticated analytical tradition than that of the common law, the mixed
nature of the Quebec legal system produces, in practice, legal research
which frequently does not reach its potential. There are no formal or
systemic limits on the types of permissible scholarship in either the
continental or the Quebec civil law cultures. Indeed, sophisticated
28 For a summary account of the influence of the Code Napoleon on the Quebec Civil Code
see J.-G. Castel, 7he Civil Law System of the Province of Quibec (1962).
29 J.L. Baudouin, "The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian Systems of Louisiana
and Quebec" in J. Dainow, ed., The Rok of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in
MbxedJurisdiction (1974) 1, and bibliography cited therein. See also R. Boult, "Aspects des rapports
entre le droit civil et Ia 'common law' dans la jurisprudence de la Cour supreme du Canada"
(1975) 53 R. du B. Can. 715.
30 Although phrased in different terminology, a similar conclusion about Quebec judgments
is reached in the symposium "L'interpretation du droit 6crit par le juge": M. Rivet & M. Ouellette-
Lauzon, "L'interpretation par le juge des r~gles 6crites en mati&e de droit civil" (1978) 13 RJ.T.
7 et seq.
31 For an illustration, again randomly selected, see Robert c. Trust Ggngral du Canada [1984]
C.A. 197 (Qu6. C.A.).
32 See Jobin, supra, note 9.
33 See supra, note 4.
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analytical research looking outwards to the wider principles presupposed
by individual exemplifications of canonical texts is required by the style
of judicial writing in Quebec.
C. La doctrine: Theories of Law as Legal Science
All legal scholarship, as all scholarship, is largely determined by
the intellectual climate within which its authors work.34 It is, therefore,
not surprising that civil law writing tends to be shaped by the three
generative ideas of the modem civil law tradition - namely, philosophical
rationalism, economic liberalism and legal positivism.35 A pure 'legal
science' is seen as an achievable goal more so than in the common
law tradition.36 Furthermore, in Quebec, much private law theory (and
its practical reflection in legal scholarship) is moulded by two other factors
- language and ethnicity. In combination, these conditioning factors
are translated into a preoccupation with the survival of the local,
vernacular, civilian tradition which has, in turn, dictated a specific scholarly
agenda.
Private law scholarship in France is dominated by writers who
subscribe to a legal philosophy of 'positivisme 9tatique'; law is seen as
a closed normative system emanating from the state.37 For reasons
probably having to do with language and perceptions about normative
antecedents, most private law scholarship in Quebec (although not private
law legislative and judicial activity) is responsive to French, as opposed
to other continental civil law, intellectual influences. A variety of features
of academic writing reflect this influence, notably the summa divisio
between legal scholarship and scholarship about law.38
No simplistic distinction between the academic writing undertaken
by rationalists (formalists) as opposed to that of empiricists (realists) is
34 For the implications of this view, see S.K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3d ed. (1957)
at 1-8; C.S.S. Peirce, Essays in the Philosophy of Science ed. by V. Tomas (1957) at 236-46; Atias,
Epistemologiejuridique (1985).
35 See Prdvault, "Les fondements philosophiques du Code Napol~on" (1975-76) 64 Studi urbinati
143; A.-J. Amaud, Les origines doctrinales du Code civilfranfais (1973). For the position in Quebec
see T. McCord & G. Nicholls, "Synopsis of the Changes in the Law" in The Civil Code of Lower
Canada (1867) i-xxx; P.-A. Crdpeau, "La renaissance du droit civil canadien", and Caron, "De
la physionomie, de 1'6volution et de 'avenir du Code civil" in Livre centennaire du Code civil
1(1970).
36 The most powerful expression of this view can be found in F. Grny, Science et technique
en droitprivipositif(1914-1924) (4 volumes). See also J.H. Merryman, supra, note 8, c. X.
37 See P. Roubiere, Thdorie gfdnrale du droit 2e. 6d. (1951); H.F. Jolowicz, "Utility and Elegance
in Civil Law Studies" (1949) 65 L.Q. Rev. 322.
38 For a summary of divergent points of view in continental Europe see Ghestin & Goubeaux,
supra, note 9 at 72-80. See also A. Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law (1978).
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here proposed or relied upon. Rather, the point is that Quebec private
law scholarship typically has embodied only a fragment of the civilian
tradition. Understandably, this fragment has its wellsprings in the period
in which it was thrown off, and being removed geographically and
politically from mainstream French legal thought, has retained much
of its initial orientation.39 What is more, because for at least eighty years
private law scholarship has been primarily undertaken in French, it has
been even less influenced by many of the intellectual currents which
have swept both Europe (Germany and England in particular) and North
America. Since other scholarship, notably in commercial law, public law
and criminal law is written in both English and French and reflects these
cross-currents, a cleavage has developed between civil law and non-
civil law scholarship in Quebec. The authors of the former conceive
of themselves as guardians of their civilization through their insistence
on a particular theory of law, legal science and legal scholarship.40
In practical terms, this custodial mission has generated a strong
commitment among Quebec private law scholars to linguistic analysis
of codal texts.41 Despite wide recognition of the mixed nature of Quebec's
legal traditions,4, a prime value embraced by most French-language
commentators upon one of its major components, the private civil law,
is systemic integrity or purity. 3 It is not just language and cultural factors
peculiar to Quebec which lead to a fear of corruption for the theory
of legal science itself places a premium on weeding out legal transplants
39 The word of Louis Hartz in, for example, The Founding of New Societies (1964) is instructive.
For analyses focusing on legal phenomenon, see J.H. Merryman, "On the Covergence (and Divergence)
of the Civil Law and the Common Law" (1981) 17 Stan. J. Int'l Law 357; W. Twining & J.
Uglow, eds., Legal Literature in Small Jurisdictions (1981); T.B. Smith, "Legal Imperialism and Legal
Parochialism" (1965) 10 Jur. Rev. (N.S.) 39. An excellent overview of the intellectual climate
in Quebec is presented in D. Moni~re, Ideologies In Quibec: The Historical Development, trans. R.
Howard (1981). See, finally, J. Palardy, The Early Furniture of French Canada, trans E. MacLaren
(1967), for a specific example of how ideology influences practical activity in 'fragment' cultures.
40 For some this insularity of the civil law is a virtue. See, for example, P. Azard, "Le Droit
Qurbecois, pike maitresse de la civilization canadienne-frangaise" (1963) 5:2 C. de D. 7. A similar,
although less extreme view is argued by P.-A. Crdpeau, supra, note 35 A la p. xiii.
4' See M. Tancelin, "Introduction" in M. Tancelin, ed., Walton's Scope and Interpretation of
the Civil Code of Lower Canada (1981), a reprint of the 1907 work.
42 See L. Baudouin, Le droit civil de la province de Quibec: modale vivant de droit compard
(1953); "Conflicts nrs de la coexistence juridique au Canada" (1956-57) 3 McGill LJ. 51; Tancelin,
ibid; Mignault, "Les rapports entre le droit civil et la 'common law' au Canada, sp~cialement
dans la province de Quebec" (1932) 11 R. de D. 201.
43 The periodical literature on this topic is enormous, if trivial. See the sources cited in the
footnotes to L. Baudouin ibid, n. 19. A flavour may be gained from Mignault, "Conservons notre
droit civil" (1936) 15 R. de D. 28; V. Morin, "L'Anglicisation de notre droit civil" (1937) 40
R. du Notariat 145; and J.-G. Castel, "Le juge Mignault dffenseur de l'integrit6 du droit civil
qudbrcois" (1975) 53 R. du B. Can. 544. To be fair, it is also true that xenophobia has afflicted
the common law: see eg. J.W. Cairns, "Blackstone, an English Institutist: Legal Literature and
the Rise of the Nation State" (1984) 4 Ox. J. Leg. Stud. 318; Baker, "The Constitution of Upper-
Canadian Legal Thought in the late-Victorian Empire" (1985) 3 Law and Soc. Rev. 1.
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and preventing linguistic and conceptual cross-pollination.44 However, the
pursuit of purity for its own sake is a dangerous preoccupation which,
when carried to extremes, can lead to paradoxical results.45
One example will illustrate how a quest for purity not only may
deflect academic writing away from other concerns, but also may reveal
an absence of self-consciousness. For centuries the civil law has understood
the theory of the 'charge' as a security device (the hypothec). As noted
earlier, the hypothec did not lie over moveables. Now, after several
attempts, the legislatures of many common law jurisdictions have come
to understand how a security device can function as a charge; that is,
how 'title' and the division of legal and equitable rights are not the only
way of generating a security interest. Some civil law scholars in Quebec
today, however, resist the establishment of a general non-possessory
security over moveables, which they see as common law heresy. Thus,
a fundamental civil law idea (the hypothec), extended in the common
law to moveables, is attacked as insufficiently civilian by certain Quebec
private lawyers.46
The preoccupation with survival and purity has strongly influenced
both the form and the substance of Quebec private law scholarship. While
French private law commentary47 remains predominantly analytical of
codal texts, certain circles are now accepting those engaged in "scholarship
about law".48 Yet such an accommodation has not yet been negotiated
44 Compare, in Livre centennaire de la socidtt de legislation comparE, the essays by Marty "Les
apports du droit compar6 au droit civil" 91, and Rodi~re, "Le renouvellement du droit commercial
frangais par le droit compare" 109. The resistence of private civil law to bastardizing tendencies
is highlighted in R. David, Traiti ilbmentaire de droit civil compari (1950).
45 As a philosophical ideal 'purity' has long been subject to attack. For a particularly inventive
demonstration of its incoherence see M. Foss, The Idea of Perfection in the Western World (1947).
46 It is precisely this resistence to global reform which induced the legislature, in 1984, to
create a provincial analogue to section 178 security by means of extra-codal legislation. See R.A.
Macdonald, "Inventory Financing in Quebec After Bill 97" (1984) 9 Can. Bus. LJ. 153.
47 This commentary includes that of adherent to the 'libre recherche scientifique' school
championed by Francois Grny at the turn of this century. See F. G~ny, Mtlhode d'interpretation
et sources de droit privJ positif (1916); M. Villey, Leons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit (1962);
C. Perelman, Droi4 morale etphilosophie (1968).
48 Even such notable representatives of the classical view as Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra,
note 9, are prepared to consider economics, history, sociology, philosophy and comparative law
as disciplines "auxilaires au droi". See pages 72-80, and page 189, where the authors conclude
"la doctrine moderne de droit privi devait avoir une meilleure connaissance du phgnomne juridique
dans son ensemble, a travers la sociologie juridiqug et qu'elle devait dlargir son optique par l'dtude
de la philosophie du droit compari et des faits et theories dconomique&" See also P. Durand, "La
connaissance du phdnom6ne juridique et les taches de ]a doctrine moderne du droit priv" [1956]
D.S. chron. A la p. 73.
Notable modern French works in this new genre are R. Savatier, Droit et histoire, R. David,
Les grands systkmes de droit contemporain 8e dd. (1984); J. Carbonnier, Sociologie juridque, 6d
rev. (1978); G. Ripert, Ledclin du droit(1949); and C. Perelman, Logiquejuridique" nouvelle rhttorique,
2e d. (1979).
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in Quebec private law, even though in public law fields, a peaceful and
fruitful co-existence has long reigned. Economic analysis of property,
contract and delict is not a new way of looking at the rules of the Civil
Code; it is often seen as an American corruption. Empirical research
and legal sociology are, whatever else, not legal scholarship. A preoc-
cupation with history and philosophy is thought to distort writing about
legal concepts and rules. In other words, even though French legal scholars
engaged in analytical research are beginning to make use of other
disciplines, in Quebec the predominant tendency is to banish these from
legal discourse.
While fragment theory may partially explain this attitude of iso-
lationism and conservatism, the desire to preserve a pure civilian legal
science is a more important reason for the hostile position in Quebec
private law.49 Economics is held to be not culture specific: there are
Marxists in France, in the United States, in the United Kingdom and
in Quebec; the same is true of Chicago or welfare economists. A similar
point can be made about empiricism. The methodology for collecting
the raw material of legal sociology - data about rates of plaintiff recovery,
insurance company behaviour, marriage breakdown and the like - is
believed to transcend juridical boundaries. To accept these models and
methods invites the displacement of those features of law which are
held to be distinctive of Quebec's vernacular, civilian tradition (its
conceptual structure, its internal logic, its normative framework) from
the centre of scholarly endeavour.50 It follows that, in Quebec, a concern
with purity (both systemic and intellectual) almost necessarily implies
a very limited private law research agenda: an agenda not characteristic
of the civil law outside of Quebec.s'
D. Legal Scholarship in Quebec Civil Law: Is la doctrine doctrinal
analysis?
The generation of theories to justify the role of legal scholarship
in the civil law tradition is only a first step to understanding civil law
scholarship in Quebec. It is also important to consider whether, for a
civilian, the terms la doctrine, doctrinal analysis and legal scholarship
49 Even some of the writing about the new Quebec Civil Code implicitly adopts this perspective.
See, for example, Civil Code Revision Office, Report on the Civil Code (1977), foreword.
50 1 do not mean to imply that the dichotomy between that which thought to culture-specific
(conceptual analysis) and that which is thought to be trans-cultural (empiricism, eta) can be justified.
Obviously empirical methods may also bejurisdiction specific;and, of course, analytical conceptualism
may be trans-systemic.
51 See the analysis in J.H. Merryman, "On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil
Law and the Common Law" (1981) 17 Stan. J. Int'l Law 357.
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are synonymous. This requires a general assessment of the forms and
functions of legal writing.
Modem civil law scholarship appears in several forms: first - books
such as treaties, monographs, course manuals and published theses; second
- legal periodicals containing articles, case comments and legislative
notes; third - governmental sources such as law reform commission
reports, ministerial studies and working papers; and fourth - research
aids such as digests, abridgments and citators. Each attempts to discern,
display and evaluate legal norms. 52 Perhaps this common feature accounts
for the predominant tendency in France to consider all written material
about law to be la doctrine.53 Nevertheless, evaluative judgments as to
whether a particular work merits that label are possible.54
Any literary (as opposed to conventional or customary) source of
law or legal justification must have certain intellectual attributes.55 La
doctrine, one such literary source, performs five main functions. It has
a puzzle-solving or explicative function. It also provides a critical
perspective on legal postulates in order to discern their fundamental
premises. Further, la doctrine examines the evolution of both legal norms
and their social functions, suggesting new formulations and unprecedented
applications of existing rules. Again, it elaborates the logical and ideo-
logical structure of a given area of the law. Finally, it integrates various
sources of legal justification into their political and social context.
Judged by these criteria most modem civil law scholarship in law
(doctrinal analysis) cannot be considered as la doctrine because it lacks
critical perspective. Again, most civil law scholarship about law (historical,
sociological, philosophical and economic analysis) also cannot be con-
sidered as la doctrine because it ignores conceptual structure and logical
coherence.56 In other words, there is an important distinction to be drawn
in the civil law between la doctrine and doctrinal analysis. La doctrine
is qualitative: it is used only in reference to scholarship that may be
invoked as a source of legal justification within the law itself. In Rudolph
52 This trichotomy is taken from J. Rivero, Droit administratif, 9e . (1980) no. 68 A la p. 73-
4.
53 See, for example, Dalloz, PNpertoire de droit civil 2e &., t. 3; "Doctrine - l'ensemble des
Itudes publes par lesjuristes; les opinions qu'ils imettentsur les questions qui relaent de leurspicialitA "
54 See Weill & Terr6, Droit civil introduction gintrale, 4e d. (1979) no. 230 A la p. 245-
6, who distinguish between "ouvrages scolaires", "ouvrages de pratique" and "ouvrages de doctrine
proprement dits".
55 See the discussion in Archives de philosophie du droit 'sources' de droit (1982).
56 If anything, the situation in the common law world is worse. See Law and Learning, supra,
note 1.
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Sohm's lexicon, la doctrine serves to develop the wider principles which
a given rule of law may imply. Doctrinal analysis, by contrast, describes
a particular focus of legal scholarship: the technique of correlating code
and case, of exemplifying legal rules and of paraphrasing codal texts.57
In the light of these distinctions, one might well think that the classical
(and distinctive) civil law contribution to legal scholarship - the multi-
volume comprehensive private law treatise seems most likely to merit
the epithet "la doctrine". By and large, this is so. Yet, as one eminent
French commentator has observed, these treatises, while conceptually
outstanding, frequently are methodologically inadequate. "Les traitds de
droit civil comportent, en introduction quelques 6ldments de mdthodolo-
gie... Cette m~thodologie me parait le plus ordinairement se rduire *6
un catalogue comment6 des 'sources' - ou pr6tendues telles. '"s Another
critic-9 has decried the contemporary scholarly preoccupation of French
civilians with rationalizing cases and commenting on recent legislative
developments, to the exclusion of more philosophical inquiry: "La tate
la plus remplie des souvenirs d'arrts divers, doit etre naturellement la plus
vide d'id~es sur les grands principes du droit, parce qu'elle appartient '
l'homme qui s'est fait une itude de ne penser que par les autres. "6o
Thus, one returns to the point of departure. The private civil law
tradition in general (and in Quebec in particular) places a higher value
on scholarship in law of a "fundamental nature",61 (according to it alone
the preferred status of la doctrine, or of a true source of law), than on
scholarship about law of a 'fundamental nature'. Why, then, is the
comparative absence of empirical research into law not compensated
by a comparative flourishing of private law theory? This question, which
can only be addressed properly once both the authors and audiences
of Quebec civil law writing have been identified, will be explored in
the conclusion to this essay.
57 There is also a distinction to be drawn between both la doctrine and doctrinal analysis
on the one hand, and scholarship about law on the other. Scholarship about law involves developing
(or criticizing) a legal rule by reference to its consequences. This scholarship is both more necessary
and more fruitful in common law jurisdictions, where doctrinal analysis tends to be neither la
doctrine, nor empirically sophisticated.
58 M. Villey, Philosophic du droit (1979) t. 2, no. 132. See also de la Maunirre, Elements
de Mgthodologiejuridique (1976) no. 56-63 A Ia p. 119-29 for a pessimistic appraisal of la doctrine
as it appears in modem treatises.
59 Atias, "La mission de la doctrine universitaire en droit priv" (1980) 45 Sem. Jurid. 1.2999.
60 J.B.V. Proudhon, Traiti des droits d'usufiuc d'usage personnel et d'habitation (1836) t. I,
preface.
61 1 adopt the perspective of Law and Learning that legal theory (philosophy, liguistics, political
theory, etc.), as well as empirical research may constitute fundamental legal scholarship. See supra,
note 1, esp. at 69-70. For further development see F. Schauer, "Does Doctrine Matter?" (1984)
82 Mich. L.R. 655.
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II. THE PRACTICE OF CIVIL LAW SCHOLARSHIP IN
QUEBEC
The history of private law scholarship in Quebec may be periodized
in several ways, each reflecting a slightly different preoccupation. In view
of this essay's purposes, a classification grounded primarily in observations
about the authors of legal scholarship, and only secondarily in their
intellectual preoccupations, has been adopted. The first period of the
civilian scholarly tradition runs from its eighteenth-century beginnings
until the flourishing of Quebec's law faculties in the mid-1960s. This
period, labelled 'the historical pattern', is sub-divided into four stages:
precodification; the late nineteenth century; the years 1900 to 1945; and
the post-War years, 1945 to 1966. Scholarship from the mid-1960s until
shortly after the Civil Code Revision Office completed its work in 1977
then will be reviewed as the product of an 'emergent university tradition'.
The material published in Quebec especially since 1980 is identified
as 'contemporary scholarship', and will be used to discern any new
tendencies in private law scholarly writing.62
Before commencing this survey, however, it is important to make
two general disclaimers. To begin with, bibliographic comprehensiveness
has not been even remotely achieved. Private civil law scholarship has,
in principle, taken four main forms: treatises, monographs, theses and
periodical articles. Most bibliographies tend to report only material
published in these traditional forms within Quebec. Yet there has always
been a significant legal literature by Quebec authors published in foreign
jurisdictions, and several non-lawyers have published important studies
in non-legal collections. What is more, the work appearing in these non-
standard sources typically reflects preoccupations other than classical
scholarship, so that it is impossible to extrapolate meaningfully solely
on the basis of the material reported here. The survey which follows,
therefore, must be read with the caveat that it primarily reports writing
by the legally-trained for the legally-trained and published in Quebec.
62 In assembling the data reported in this section I have drawn on R. Boult, Bibliographie
du droit canadien, 2e dd. (1977); and M. Chrdtien-Rioux, Ripertoire des thses de doctorat et de
maitrise soutenues dans les facultas de droit des universitds du Quibec et de l'Universitd d'Ottawa,
Section de droit civil (1978, supp. 1979, 1980). I also profitted from the essays by Jobin, supra,
note 9, J.E.C. Brierley, "Qudbec's Civil Law Codification: Viewed and Reviewed" (1968) 14 McGill
Li. 521, and Normand, "Une analyse quantitative de la doctrine en droit civil qudbrcois" (1982)
23 C. de D. 1009. The "Early Canadiana Collection" of the McGill University Law Library, the
encyclopaedic knowledge of eighteenth and nineteenth century Quebec law of my predecessor,
Professor J.E.C. Brierley, and the index compiled by my colleague, Professor G. Blaine Baker,
as well as his general historical insights, also have been valuable bibliographical sources.
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A second qualification is that the historiography of Quebec private
law scholarship has yet to be written.63 Indeed, it would be premature
now to attempt to generate a general theory of the ideas, commitments
and beliefs of those doing legal scholarship during the periods under
review. Hence, not only must the conclusions and assessments drawn
here be taken as tentative, but also the data itself should be viewed
with some skepticism. Until one has at least a vague perception of what
one is seeking (and why), one typically does not find it.
A. The Historical Pattern (1775-1966)
For obvious reasons, most twentieth-century assessments of the civil
law in Canada focus on the post-codification era., Yet this engrossment
belies the considerable earlier legal scholarship.s Furthermore, given the
general confusion as to sources of the law, given the fact that certain
key texts were available either in English only or in French only and
given the absence of any legislative synthesis,66 this scholarship was
remarkably erudite and varied. Most monographs and treatises were,
however, primarily professional in orientation, being either legislative
annotations or commentaries on the Coutume de Paris 67Nevertheless,
it would be a mistake to characterize this work as 'doctrinal analysis'
63 Some fieldwork in Canadian historiography which can be carried over into law has been
undertaken by, among others, C. Berger, The Writing of Canadian History (1976). Yet to my knowledge
no similar study of "clio" in Quebec has appeared. See the remarks of A. Morel, "Canadian Legal
History - Retrospect and Prospect" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L. 159.
64 See notably, Livre centennaire du Code Civil (1968-1970) (2 volumes), and sources cited
therein; Baudouin, supra, note 42; and Normand, supra, note 61.
65 For a detailed analysis and bibliography, see Brierley, supra, note 61. One might hazard
a guess that most Canadian legal writing in this period originated in Quebec.
66 See Brierley, ibiL at 533-40, and Castel, supra, note 28, Part I.
67 See the authors mentioned in the minutes of the Civil Code Codification Commission (1866).
Well-known pre-codification works include: FJ. Cugnet, Trait abrg des anciennes loi. coutumes
et usages de la colonie de Canada aujourd'hui province de Quibec (1775); . McCarthy, Dictionnaire
de l'ancien droit du Canada (1809); J.F. Perrault, Questions et riponses sur le droit civil du Bas-
Canada (1810); H. des R. Beaubien, Trait sur les lois civiles du Bas-Canada (1832) (3 volumes);
N.B. Doucet, Fundamental Principles of the Laws of Canada (1841-43) (2 volumes); L.H. Lafontaine,
Analyse de l'Ordonnance du Conseil special sur les bureaux d'hypotheques (1842); A. Gorrie, A Synopsis
of the Laws of Letting and Hiring (1848); E.L. Montizambert, A Lecture on the Mercantile Law
of Lower Canada (1848); 1. Crdmazie, Manuel des notions utiles (1852); . Bonner, An Essay on
the Registry Laws of Lower Canada (1852); M. Bibaud, Commentaires sur les lois du Bas-Canada,
suivi d'une notice historique (1859-1862) (2 volumes); E.-L. de Bellefeuille, Thse sur les mariages
clandestins (1860); D. Girouard, Essai sur es lettres de changes et les billets promissoires (1860);
T.K. Ramsay, Notes sur la Coutume de Paris (1864).
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since much of it was intended precisely to generate legal doctrine from
a variety of historical, judicial, legislative and sociological materials.68
Codification slowly wrought changes in earlier patterns of private
law scholarship. The new legislative text stimulated exegetical commen-
taries, and led to a series of annotational sourcebooks.69 While some
post-codification civil law analyses consisted of institutional, historical,
overfly political and economic studies70 this broader scholarship, which
in many respects continued the pre-codification tradition, began to wane
in the last decades of the nineteenth century.7' The last major domestic
work with this orientation was Frederick Parker Walton's Scope and
Interpretation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which appeared in
1907.
Towards the turn of the nineteenth century a new focus in legal
scholarship emerged, which led to practical legal studies directed to the
profession.72 For at least the next fifty years, legal writing was primarily
analytical and exegetical upon codal texts.73 The model for such writing
was the multi-volume treatise, of which the most famous was Pierre-
Basil Mignault's Droit civil canadien, published in nine volumes between
1895 and 1915.74 In this second post-codification era, the amount of
monographic literature being published also dwindled. Apart from the
68 Such a conclusion may be deduced not only from a working document drafted by one
of the codification commissioners (R.E. Caron, "Quelles sont les lois du pays actuellement en force,
et qui partant doivent toute entrer dans les codes A faire?" in Mgmoir" notes gendrales sur les lois
enforce (1959), but also from post-codification histories. See infra, notes 68-70.
69 See, for example, C. de Lorimier and C. Vilbon, La bibliothkque du Code civil de la province
de Quibec (1871-1890) (21 volumes); TJJ. Loranger, Commentaire sur le Code civil du Bas-Canada
(1873, 1879) (2 volumes); W.P. Sharp, Civil Code of Lower Canada (1889) (3 volumes); E.L. de
Bellefeuille, Le Code civil annoti 3e d. (1891); E.A. Beaudry, Le questionnaire annotg du Code
civil du Bas-Canada (1892); J.-J. Beauchamp, Code Civil de [a province de Quibec annotg (1904-
1905) (5 volumes).
70 See, for example, T. McCord, The Civil Code of Lower Canada (1867); J. de Montigny
& G. Doutre, Histoire gn9rale du droit canadien (1869); and G. Doutre & E. Lareau, Le droit
civil canadien (1872).
71 Normand, supra, note 61 calculates that some sixteen major works (treatises and monographs)
appeared between 1885 and 1905, but only two, E. Lareau, Histoire du droit Canadien (1889)
(2 volumes) and R. Lemieux, Leas origines du droitfranco-canadien (1901) were not strict analyses
of codal texts.
72 Two precursors of this trend were T.d'E. Savigny, Traiti dei substitutionsfid&ommissaires,
annotated by M. Mathieu (1889), and F. Langelier, De la preuve en matire civile et commerciale
(1894).
73 The appearance of a professional legal periodical, the Revue du Notariat, founded by the
Board of Notaries in 1898, also is evidence of this shift.
74 Other similar treatises in this period were F. Langelier's six volume Cours de droit civil
de la province de Qudbec (1905-191 1); Jett6, Cours de droit civil, published posthumously in sections
by the Revue de Droit between 1923 and 1939 and never completed; and J.-E. Billette, Traiti
thgorique et pratique de droit civil canadien (1933), which, however, consisted of only one volume,
on Donations and Wills.
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above-noted efforts at producing local civil law treatises on the French
model, fewer than forty monographs were written between approximately
1900 and 1945. These books tended to be of three main types: prac-
titioner's manuals,75 revised teaching materials76 and graduate theses.77
Academic monographic literature was very rare, and in most cases was
neither historical nor sociological in orientation.78
A final period in the pre-university era, the years from 1946 to
1966, saw a major transformation in both the volume and authorship
(although not the focus) of legal scholarship. While the seventeen-volume
Traitg du droit civil du Quebec (the Trudel collection), which appeared
between 1946 and 195 8, was almost entirely written by practising lawyers
or court officials, a pioneering and substantial non-thesis monographic
literature began to appear, largely written by full-time law professors.79
The early model for such writing was Louis Baudouin's Le droit civil
du Quebec: mode vivante de droit comparg which appeared in 1953.8o
But, interestingly, as law teaching became a career in the post-War
decades, the orientation of academic writing changed.8, In this sense,
75 For example, J. Sirois, De la forme des testaments (1907); F.L. Snow, The Law of Landlord
and Tenant in the Province of Quebec (1917); W.S. Johnson, The Conflict of Laws; with Special
Reference to the Province of Quebec (1933-1937) (3 volumes); A. Perrault, TraitM de droit commerical
(1936-1940); W.C.J. Merdith, Civil Law on Automobile Accidents (1940).
76 Two of the best examples of such words are E. Lafleur, The Conflict of Laws in the Province
of Quebec (1898); and W.deM. Marler, The Law of Real Property in Quebec (1932).
77 A representative sample would be Demers, Leprivilage (1916); J. Bouffard, TraitM du domaine
(1921); G.-M. Giroux, Leprivikge ouvrier(1933); R. Brunet, Des donations de biensfuturs en contracts
de mariage (1931); M.-L. Beaulieu, Du bornage et de l'action en bornage (1937); J. Perrault, Des
stipulations de non-responsabilitd (1939).
78 See Goldenberg, Responsibility for Offences and Quasi-offenses under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada (1932); M. Faribault, Traitg thiorique et pratique de la fiducie ou trust du droit civil dans
la province de Qudbec (1936); G.V.V. Nicholls, The Responsibility for Offences and Quasi-Offences
Under the Law of Quebec (1938); G.S. Challies, The Doctrine of Unjustfied Enrichment in the Law
of the Province de Quebec (1940). An exception was the Livre souvenir of 1936 entitled Le droit
civilfrangais, which, however, primarily considered French law.
79 Nevertheless, lawyers and notaries continued to generate a substantial number of monographs.
The following are representative of works written during this period: H. Roch, Testaments et viriflcation
(1951); E. Rivard, Les droits sur les successions dans 14 province de Quebec (1956); W.S. Johnson
The Joint and Several Liability of Architects, Engineers and Builders (1955); H. Turgeon, La succession
legithne de la province de Quebec (1959); G. Trudel, Lsion et contrat (1965); M.I. Sigler, Traffic
Accidents: Cases and Comment (Quebec) (1965).
80 See also, F.M.C. Cancino, La nullit des actesjuridiques (1950).
s When Walton published his monograph in 1907 he was the only full-time law teacher
in Quebec. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s McGill had the largest full-time complement in Canada
- three. The pioneers of Quebec private-law teaching were F.P. Walton, F.W. Lee, H.A. Smith,
F.R. Scott and S. Lemesurier. For a listing of early law teachers at other faculties commencing
in the post-War period, see Jobin, supra, note 9 at 264-5; and for a general assessment of law
teaching at this time see M. Cohen, "The Condition of Legal Education in Canada" (1950) 28
Can. B. Rev. 267.
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Baudouin's work was at once the last major non-doctrinal work and
the first of the newer analytical studies written by full-time law teachers.82
The history of legal periodicals in Quebec, and an assessment of
their content confirms the basic themes which emerge from a review
of the monographic literature. The oldest continuing law journal is the
Revue de notariat which was founded in 1898. Legal periodicals did,
however, appear earlier, and at least three, La revue de l6gislation et
de jurisprudence (1845-1848), The Law Reporter (1854) and The
Examiner - L'Observateur (1861) antedated, but did not survive,
codification. All contained an amalgam of articles, speeches, notes,
lectures, foreign judgments and local judicial decisions, 83as did La Revue
16gale: receuil de jurisprudence et d'arrts which first appeared imme-
diately following codification, in 1869. However, by 1895, after a three-
year hiatus, its second series began under the title La Revue l6gale:
publication mensuelle de droit, de l6gislation, de critique et de juris-
prudence, and case reporting had become prominent. In fact, one is
hardpressed to find any scholarship other than annotations in the journal
after 1909 when it changed its name to La Revue 16gale: publications
mensuelle des arr~ts de principe et de jurisprudence annotre. Between
1940 and 1942 the journal underwent a further metamorphosis, becoming
simply La Revue 16gale, and thereafter it published only cases.
Four other legal periodicals appeared prior to 1900, but apart from
the Legal News (1878-1897), each lasted fewer than five years.8, A fifth
now defunct publication, the Revue de droit, was published between 1922
82 The studies by A. Morel, Livolution de la doctrine de l'enrichissement sans cause (1955),
and Les limites de la liberti testamentaire dans L droit civil de la province de Quebec (1960); by
J.-G. Cardinal, Le droit de superficie (1957); by P.A. Crrpeau, La responsabiliti civile de midicin
et de l'Wtablissement hospitalier (1956); and by M.-L. Beaulieu, Le bornag, I'instance et 1'expertise,
la possession, les actions possessoires (1961) all of which arose from theses, are representative. See
also R. Comtois, Traitf thorique etpratique de la communauti des biens (1964).
I have not attempted to analyse the monographic material published during this period in
non-standard sources, or to tabulate legal scholarship by Quebec authors published in France, the
U.K. and the U.S. I have also not undertaken a thorough study of historical and sociological works
published by non-lawyers.
83 For example, the inaugural lecture of F.W. Torrance of the McGill Law Faculty on Roman
Law, delivered in January, 1854 immediately following a note about a U.S.judgment and immediately
preceding the full-text report of a Superior Court case, was reprinted in "Roman Law" [1854]
The Law Reporter 52.
84 The other three were The Lower Canada Law Journal (1865-1868), La revue critique de
16gislation et de jurisprudence du Canada (1871-1875), and La Thdmis (1879-1883). Each of
these journals, it should be noted, began as the Revue 16gale and expired primarily as a case reporter.
The third is noteworthy for its editors, de Montigny, Loranger, de Bellefeuille, de Lorimier, Beaudry
and Desrosiers, each of whom contributed a major monograph or treatise during the late nineteenth
century. Moreover, two of these editors became the guiding hands of the Revue l6gale after 1895.
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and 1939,s5 and a sixth post-codification journal, but only the second
legal periodical which remains extant, was founded in 1941 as the Revue
du Barreau. This journal has, in large measure, been the heir of legal
scholarship published in both the Revue l~gale and the Revue de droit.
From 1940 through 1960 the only regularly-appearing periodicals in
which commentary on the civil law could be found were the notaries'
professional journal, the Bar's professional journal and the professional
journal of the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Review.86
This last review, founded in 1923 as a result of the amalgamation of
the Ontario-based Canadian Law Times (1881-1922) and the Canada
Law Journal (1865-1922), contained the occasional excellent civil law
study during this period. Not surprisingly, in view of their audience and
their early editors,87 much of the material published in these journals
before 1966 was either of the after-dinner-speech variety or the brief
practical point analysis. Unlike earlier journals, which regularly published
foreign judgments and non-topical essays, scholarly historical, philoso-
phical or institutional studies on civil law topics were infrequent throughout
most of the 1940s and 1950s.
Shortly after the War, university-based legal periodicals began to
appear. In 1951 the students of the University of Montreal founded a
journal, Thdmis, but it was not until the review fell under faculty control
in 1966, and was renamed La revue juridique Th6mis, that it became
a major forum for legal scholarship. The first number of the McGill
Law Journal was published in 1952, but this student-run review did not
appear annually until 1965. The law journal at Laval, Les cahiers de
droit, was founded in 1954, but did not establish a record of regular
publication until the mid 1960s. The University of Ottawa inaugurated
a law review, Justinien, in 1966, but again, it was not until the 1970s,
when it was renamed the Revue g~n6rale de droit, that the journal became
85 This review is probably Canada's most remarkable law journal. A private undertaking, it
published a wide range of material, including the Cours Jett, throughout its history and never
succumbed to the temptation to reproduce cases.
86 It is worth noting, however, that Quebec scholarship appeared not infrequently in off-shore
publications such as the Law Quarterly Review, the Journal of the Society of Public Teachers
of Law, the Judicial Review, the Yale Law Journal, the Michigan Law Review, the Harvard Law
Review, the University of Toronto Law Journal and the Revue Trimestrielle de droit civil. In such
periodicals, as well as in non-legal sources such as the proceedings of the Institut canadien, and
those of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, the material tended to be both less parochial
and less professional.
87 In early 1957, the Canadian Bar Review broke with tradition and appointed a law professor,
J.-G. Castel, as Editor, to succeed Mr. G.V.V. Nicholls, who resigned, ironically, to take up a full-
time teaching position. The Revue du Notariat followed and later that same year with the nomination
of Professor Roger Comtois as Director. The Revue du Barreau remains under the editorial direction
of a Committee of the Bar, although in 1983 the Chair of the Committee was, for the first time,
a full-time legal academic.
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more than an in-house magazine. The last of Quebec's regularly appearing
legal periodicals, the Revue de droit de l'Universit6 de Sherbrooke, began
publication in 1970.88 Nevertheless, even in these university reviews,
throughout the period between 1946 and 1965 most civil law contributions
could not be classified as historical, sociological or institutional
scholarship.
A major influence upon legal scholarship for much of this 'historical'
period has been the existence of university law faculties. This tradition
dates, at McGill, from 1844, and from the 1870s at both Laval and
Montreal. Of course, until the 1960s the programmes of these institutions
were not under the control of full-time faculty, so professional interests
largely shaped legal scholarship.89 This university tradition, such as it
was, meant that there has always been a number of legal theses written
each year in Quebec. Forty-six theses on private law were written between
1866 and 1965, and twenty-six of these were published in monographic
form. This accounts for almost one-half of the monographic production
of the period, and over one-quarter of the works published.go Not
surprisingly, given their origins in Quebec law faculties that were
preoccupied with professional training, almost all of these theses are
analytical and exegetical.9'
A second contribution of university law faculties to civil law
scholarship during this period was the publication of professors' "Notes
de cours". Until recently, civil law teaching (whether undertaken by
lawyers, judges or full-time professors) has tended to be reflected, in
parallel fashion to common law teaching, by a particular form of
pedagogical instrument. In the common law, from the time Christopher
Columbus Langdell published his first casebook in 1872, the Cases and
Materials assemblage has been predominant. In the civil law, also from
88 According to Normand, supra, note 61, from 1866-1966 some 956 periodical articles on
the civil law was published. Of these, 576 appeared between 1946 and 1955 and 252 others between
1926 and 1945. My own sampling indicates that prior to 1946 almost all periodical literature
was written by lawyers and judges. During the 1950s this predominance continued in the professional
journals, but in the university law reviews a more equal participation by each of professors, students
and practitioners could be observed.
89 When McGill began teaching common law in the early 1920s, the Montreal Bar forced
abandonment of the programme after only a few years, on the pretext that law was a 'practical'
subject. See S. Frost and D.L. Johnston, "Law at McGill: Past, Present and Future" (1981) 27
McGill LJ. 33.
90 Normand, supra, note 61, at 1022-3. I have not been able to tabulate theses published
in history, philosophy and sociology departments which bear on legal topics.
91 This tendency should be contrasted with that revealed in post-War theses written by Quebec
students in fulfilment of graduate requirements in France. See, for example, the studies by Morel,
Cardinal and Crdpeau, supra, note 81.
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the late nineteenth century, it has been the Manuel de cours. Mr. Justice
Langelier's early treatise Cours de droit civil de la province de Quebec,
for example, first saw light as his teaching notes over a period of thirty
years (1872-1905) at Laval. Again, the work by Louis-A. Jett6 which
appeared in the Revue de droit between 1922 and 1939 was a posthumous
publication of his notes for the lectures he delivered during three decades
at the University of Laval at Montreal. Finally, even Mignault's Droit
civil canadien was not based on leading continental civil law treatises,
but on Fr6deric Mourlon's Repetitions 6crites sur le Code civil, the most
popular student manual then available in France; as such it was intended
primarily for his students at McGill.92
From 1910 through 1960, fewer such course notes were published.
The major examples, dating from the 1930s, were William deM. Marier,
The Law of Real Property (1932) and Antonio Perrault, Traitg de droit
commercial (1936-40). Nevertheless, during the 1940s and 1950s, prac-
tising lawyers and notaries teaching at law faculties frequently reworked
their course notes, even if these were rarely published as such. A major
reason for non-publication was the commitment to exegetical, codal
article-by-codal article teaching, a form of presentation adopted by the
authors of the Traiti de droit civil de Quebec, who themselves frequently
lectured at the law faculties. This state of affairs, as much as any other
factor, explains the persistence of Mignault's Droit civil canadien as the
leading civil law reference work for over sixty years.
The historical pattern may be summed up as follows. The private
law scholarship published prior to 1900 often was historical, philosophical
and largely non-professional. After the turn of the century, and at least
until the mid-1960s, analytical, exegetical and professional writing
predominated. The small number of full-time university teachers of private
law helps explain the professional orientation of most twentieth-century
civil law writing prior to 1945. But, even with the advent of a full-
time professoriate, and the inauguration of university law journals in
the 1950s, only the authorship of legal scholarship changed: professors
rather than lawyers took on a greater responsibility for writing professional
monographs and articles. The demands of pedagogy also conspired to
stimulate research in aid of elementary exegetical expositions of legal
rules.
Such classical forms of university scholarship as historical, philo-
sophical, political and institutional writing, as well as more modern
university preoccupations such as social-science research, did not figure
92 The antecedents of these works are explained in F. Langelier, Cours de droit civil canaden
(1905) t. 1, pr6face; "Editor's Note respecting the Cours Jett6" (1923) 1 R. de D. 193; P.-B. Mignault,
Le droit civil canadien (1895) L 1, pr6face.
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prominently in the scholarly agenda of either lawyers or professors prior
to 1966. Yet, the quantity of Quebec legal commentary in private law
fields exceeded that produced in the rest of Canada, and nothing
comparable in scope or analysis to Mignault's treatise has ever appeared
in common law provinces.
B. The Emergent University Tradition (1966-1977)
Nominally, one might take the end of the Second World War as
the point of departure for examining university tradition in legal scho-
larship. However, it was really not until the mid-1960s that university
law teaching became well established.93 Along with the growth of
university law faculties, three events signaled a new direction for legal
scholarship. In 1965, Professor Paul-Andr6 Cr6peau was the first aca-
demic appointed to chair the Civil Code Revision Office; 1966 saw the
centenary of the Civil Code; and in 1968, the Bar took over responsibility
for professional training. Of course, these events also coincided with the
secularization of education and the renouveau of the 'Quiet Revolution'.
As law faculties became more secure as academic institutions, university
law reviews flourished,94 new professorial positions were created"5 and
the professions began to publish bar admission and continuing education
materials in addition to their in-house periodicals.96
The centenary of the Code provoked a brief outpouring of historical
and institutional scholarship.97 Also, at this time (and even slightly earlier)
several younger professors, notably Jacques Boucher, Jean Goulet, Perry
93 Normand, supra, note 61, takes 1946 as a watershed date in scholarship, while Jobin, supra,
note 9, seems to opt for the mid-1960s as the point of departure for modem scholarship in the
civil law. This difference is explained by their criteria. Normand undertakes a quantitative analysis;
Jobin considers qualitative factors as well.
94 During a five-year period (1965-1970), La Thdmis and Cahiers de droit fell under professorial
control, and the Revue gdndrale de droit and Revue de droit de l'Universit6 de Sherbrooke were
founded.
95 See Jobin, supra, note 9 at 164-265. At McGill this development occurred slightly earlier,
with the hiring of Gerald LeDain, Jean-Gabriel Castel, Paul-Andr6 Crdpeau and John W. Dumford.
J.-G. Castel's The Civil Law System of the Province of Quebec (1962) was the first of the new-
style teaching materials to focus on historical and institutional subjects.
96 See for example, the Cours de perfectionnement of the Board of Notaries and the Cours
de la Formation Professionelle of the bar, for multi-volume student-oriented doctrinal studies.
97 See in particular, J.L. Baudouin, "Le Code Civil Qu6bdcois: Crise de croissance ou crise
de vieillesse" (1966) 44 R. du B. Can. 391, in the special number of the Revue devoted to the
Civil Law; A. Morel, "L'apparition de Ia succession testamentaire" (1966) 26 R. du B. 499 in
the special number of the Revue devoted to the Civil code Centenary; Brierley, supra, note 64;
the two volume Livre centennaire du Code civil (1970); and Baudouin, supra, note 9. See also A.
Popovici, ed., Melanges Baudouin Problimes de droit contemporain (1974), and J.S. Ziegel & W.F.
Foster, eds., Aspects of Comparative Commerical Law (1969).
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Meyer and Andr6 Morel, were writing on such subjects as jurimetrics,
legal theory, sociology of law and legal history.98 Nevertheless, academic
writing soon reverted to more topical subjects, as two new civil law
treatise projects were announced: the first to appear, the Traiti dltmentaire
de droit civil, began in 1970 at the University of Montreal, and by 1977
had five volumes;99 the second, Droit civil qudbdcois, originated in the
late 1950s at the University of Ottawa but was not published until 1971 .oo
Neither of these projects was conceived of nor written in the grand style
of any one of the major continental Traitg thtorique et pratique du droit
civil. In effect, both followed the student prrcis model. Both were written
exclusively by professors, and both now seem to have run out of
momentum.o,,
The vast bulk of the monographic literature published since 1966
has had a distinctly pedagogical orientation. Indeed, much of it has been
in the modified "Notes de cours" format. At the University of Montreal,
a student collection, Les cours de thmis, appeared during the 1970s and
was frequently revised.,o2 A similar series, La collection bleue, was published
a few years later by professors at the University of Ottawa.,°3 Com-
plementing these series were a variety of individual civil law monographs
published by professors at other faculties, and intended primarily as student
98 See for example, J. Boucher, "La Coutume de Vexin" (1964) 14 Thrmis 57; "L'histoire
de la condition juridique et sociale de la femme au Canada frangais" in Livre centennaire die Code
civi 1 (1970) 155; J. Goulet, "Revalorisation du droit et jurimdtrie" (1967) 9 C. de D. 9; . Goulet
& E. Caparros, "A propos d' un tour d'horizon compleb> sur ]a recherche dans les sciences juri-
diques" (1969) 10 C. de D. 476; P. Meyer, "Jurimetrics: the Scientific Method in Legal Research"
(1966) 44 Can. B. Rev. 1; "The contribution of Natural Law to Positive Law in Quebec" (1966)
R. de D. Comp. 5; A. Morel, "La codification devant l'opinion publique de l'6poque" in Livre
centennaire du Code civi- 1(1970) 27; "L'imposition et le contrrle des peines au baillage de Montrdal
(1666-1693)" in Etudes Bissonette (1968) 411.
99 The volumes have been J.-L. Baudouin, Les obligations (1970); A. Mayrand, Les successions
ab inestat (1971); J. Pineau, La Famile (1972); J.-L. Baudouin, La responsabiliti civile delictuelle
(1973); and P. Martineau, La prescription (1977).
100 The only volume to appear has been P. Azard & A.-F. Bisson, Droit civil qugbicol. Notions
fondamentaes; famille incapacits (1971).
101 No volume in either series has been published since 1977. The revised versions of the
I. Pineau and J.-L. Baudouin studies have now appeared as separate monographs. See J. Pineau,
Mariage, siparation, divorce (1978); J.-L. Baudouin, Les obligations 2e 6d. (1983); La responsabilitd
civile ddlictuelle, 2e 6d. (1985).
102 The volumes which have appeared in this series are: G. Brire, Les libdraliltfds (1972); G.
Brire, Les successions ab intestat (1972); J. Pineau, Les r g'nes matrimnoniaux (1972); P. Martineau,
Les Biens (1973); R. Joyal-Poupart, Lafamille (1973); M. Pourcelet, La vente (1974); M. Ouellette-
Lauzon, Droit des personnes et de la famille (1976); J. Pineau & M. Ouellette-Lauzon, Thgorie de
la responsabilitticivile (1978); J. Pineau, Thtiorie des obl'gations (1979). Several are now in subsequent
editions.
103 The volumes in this series are C. Perret, Pricis de responsabiliti civile (1979); C. Ducharme,
Pricis de la preuve, 2e 6d. (1982); G. Bri~re, Les Liberalits (1982), the eighth edition of the former
Cours de tWmis;, G. Bri~re, Las successions ab intestat (1983), the ninth edition of the former Cours
de thgmis, and A. Larouche, Pricis des obligations (1983).
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pr6cis.,o, One pedagogical instrument that deserves special mention is
Maurice Tancelin's Jurisprudence sur les obligations (1973), which was
the first commercially-produced casebook on a private civil law subject.o5
After 1966 two other types of monographic literature were occa-
sionally produced by law teachers. These were practitioner-oriented works
on areas of current importance in the civil law,106 and a small number
of genuinely scholarly monographs.o7 Complementing these single volume
studies were various series of topical studies written by law professors
and published within law faculties.,o8 Coincidentally, the scholarly pro-
ductivity of lawyers and notaries declined markedly. Of course, the
professional corporations continued to produce annual Bar Admission
materials, notably the Cours de formation professionelle du Barreau du
Quebec and the Cours de perfectionnement du Notariat, but the privately
published civil law studies characteristic of earlier periods all but
disappeared.o0
The picture in the law reviews is similar, although a more varied
scholarship does appear. In the period following 1966, some 800 articles,
notes and comments about private civil law were published in Quebec
legal periodicals. More than one-half of this material dealt with family
law and the law of obligations (including sale and lease), and more than
two-thirds of it was written by full-time law teachers.,o What is more,
104 See, for example, M.A. Tancelin, Thkorie du droit des obligations (1975); T. Rousseau-
Houle, Pricis du droit de la vente et du louage (1978); E. Caparros, Les rigimes matrimoniaux du
Qudbec (1979); E. Groffier, Pricis de droit international privi quibicois (1980). Most of these are
now in a second or third edition.
305 Nevertheless, case-method and problem-method teaching is not widespread, and published
materials have tended to reflect a pedagogical orientation. Thus, prior to 1970 most teaching was
magisterial; the seventies were the years of the polycopi, now, it seems, the demands of pedagogy
(and perhaps the CEGEPisation of law faculties) have further devalued scholarly coinage. A new
series, Les Mimentos Thmis has appeared at the University of Montreal. This series, which is even
typeset in the format of class notes, comprises, in civil law, Lauzon, Erdcution desjugements (1983)
and P. Ciotola, Les sfiret&s (1984).
106 For example, R. Comtois, Essai sur les donations par contrat de mariage (1968); J. Pineau,
Mariage, separation divorce (1978); E. Caparros, Les lignes de force dans l'ivolution du droit des
rigimes matrimoniaux (1978); P.Y. Marquis, La responsabilitj civile du notaire officier public (1977);
J. Pineau & D. Burman, Effets du marriage et r~gimes matrimonlaux (1984).
107 A. Mayrand, L'inviolabilitJ de la personne humaine (1975); M.C. Cumyn, Les droits des
binnficiaires d'un usufruct d'une substitution et d'unefiducie (1979); F. Frenette, L'emphytjose (1983);
H. Battifol, Les contrats en droit international privg compar (1981); J. Ghestin, Le contrat (1982);
C. Larroumet, Riflexions sur la responsabilitg civile (1983).
108 See, for example, Lois nouvelles (1964, 1965) of the University of Montreal; the Meredith
Memorial Lectures (1950-1984) at McGill; and Les Colloques de l'Universitti de Sherbrooke (1980-
1984).
109 The Bar and the Board of Notaries also produced a significant volume of continuing education
material. In addition, the Board of Notaries has assembled a multi-volume Ripertoire dedroit, complete
with full-text reproductions of cases, as well as forms and precedents.
130 See Normand, supra, note 61 and Jobin, supra, note 9. This is to be contrasted with the
1950s when professional periodicals were dominated by articles from legal practitioners.
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of the thirty to forty non-topical articles on private law matters, more
than twenty dealt with specific aspects of Civil Code Revision. Fewer
than fifty articles, notes or comments published during the period of
an emergent university tradition in Quebec focused on historical, phi-
losophical, economic or sociological approaches to the private civil law.,,
Much of the explanation for the predominantly analytical focus of
1970s private law scholarship can be found in the third major event
of the mid-1960s, the appointment of a law professor to chair the Civil
Code Revision Office.,, The impact of this project, which absorbed almost
the entire energies of private civil law scholars from about 1966 to 1977,
was enormous. Some two hundred lawyers, judges and law teachers
participated in the Office's various committees. Moreover, law reform
necessarily has a positivistic, instrumental and analytical focus. Some
valuable empirical and comparative research was also undertaken for
the Revision Office, although not all areas of private law were examined,
and frequently the studies lacked a viable methodology. Finally, this
enormous research lies, for the most part, unpublished, unindexed and,
consequently, inaccessible to most younger scholars.'"
The force and impact of the Revision Project is far from spent.
As the legislature proceeds to enactment, Book by Book (often with
significant amendment) of the Draft Civil Code, participants in the
Revision Project are called upon to defend, reargue, modify and rethink
their proposals. Furthermore, significant law reform generates a need
for doctrinal exposition and synthesis. Much effort is, therefore, now being
devoted, in articles and monographs, to analytical commentaries upon
proposals now enacted.,,1
A second major reason for the analytical orientation of private law
scholarship during the 1960s and 1970s can be best understood as a
side-effect of the Quiet Revolution. For twenty years, private law has
been distinctly out of favour among young law teachers in Quebec.
Constitutional, administrative and labour law are preferred graduate
pursuits. There has been, as a consequence, much excellent empirical,
historical and institutional work in public law generated by the Laval
I I have attempted to reproduce the methodology of A. Janisch, Profile of Published Legal
Research (1982), who, in sampling for the Law and Learning Report, came to a similar conclusion.
112 See R.A. Macdonald, Comment (1980) 58 Can. B. Rev. 185 for an outline and assessment
of the methodology of the Revision Project.
"3 The Archives of the Civil Code Revision Office are on deposit with the McGill Law Library
through the Quebec Centre of Private and Comparative Law, but are as yet neither properly indexed
nor cross-referenced.
114 It is a fair conclusion that the reason for extensive writing in family law, leasing and
consumer law during the 1970s was the important legislative reforms undertaken in these areas.
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Laboratoire de recherche sur la justice administrative and the Centre de
recherche en droit public at the University of Montreal.,,5
One can see in private law scholarship of the 1970s something akin
to a lost generation phenomenon. Most civil law teaching and research
during the 1970s was undertaken by professors hired before 1970.
Necessarily, given the underdeveloped university context in which they
studied, the Civil Code Revision Project and the need to generate teaching
materials, most of their work was analytical and expository. Law teachers
who joined faculties during the 1970s took up the political and social
challenge of the Quiet Revolution primarily in public law. The civil law
professoriate aged and was not renewed with more modem preoccu-
pations; the public law professoriate increasingly moved away from
traditional research. Civil law teaching thereby attracted only that small
number of self-selecting young professors who wished to undertake
analytical research. It was as if deeply implanted in the psyche of civil
law scholars were a controlling and limiting conception of legal scho-
larship as only formal, conceptual analysis. Young scholars interested
in empirical approaches, historical studies, economic analysis and legal
culture invariably were researching and writing in public law topics.
Consequently, a generation gap appeared in the civil law professoriate,
and this gap was reflected in scholarly orientation.,, 6
In retrospect, the period of emergent law faculties was a partial
disappointment with respect to civil law scholarship. The period began
with a flourish of creativity and a cadre of young professors capable
of carrying the scholarly tradition beyond professional and purely ana-
lytical research. The need to create a 'modem' civil law doctrine which
was by then fifty years out of date in some areas, as well as the deflection
of interest to the Civil Code Revision Project, to public law subjects
and to the 'national question' in Quebec slowed considerably the pace
of these developments.
As one surveys the scholarly scene at the turn of the 1980s, however,
two major developments since 1966 are apparent. First, the vast bulk
of civil law scholarship is now being undertaken by full-time professors.
Second, there are only a few areas of private law, notably theoretical
aspects of the law of property, secured transactions and registration of
rights,,,7 which have not had a modem coverage in monographic form
115 See, for example, the bibliographical survey undertaken in J.G. Belley, "Du juridique et
du politique en sociologie du droit: A propos de la recherche Droit et socidtd urbaine au Qudbec"
(1983) 17 RJ.T. 445.
116 1 wish to thank my colleague Professor J.E.C. Brierley for helping me to formulate this
idea.
117 See CLIC, Ecritsjuridique canadiens contemporains, Enoncg des besoins (1980).
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and detailed treatment in the periodicals. Once again, while one might
have wished for a greater outpouring of historical and sociological work,
and an even more sophisticated level of analytical writing, the product
of these first years of the university tradition is remarkable, and far superior
to any comparable writing in common law jurisdictions.,8 It remains
to assess whether or not contemporary civil law scholars based in the
law faculties are now on the threshold of also undertaking more
fundamental research.
C. Contemporary Scholarship (1977- )
Because history does not divide itself into convenient time periods,
one is always slightly embarrassed by the choice of date from which
to compute that which is contemporary. For present purposes, the end
of the 1970s has (more or less) been chosen as a cut-off point. Two
related reasons sustain this choice: first, the Civil Code Revision Office
submitted its report and wound up its various study committees in 1977;
second, a major private law research group, the Quebec Research Centre
for Private and Comparative Law was established at the same time.,,9
Just as the Civil Code Revision Office dominated the private law research
agenda of the emergent university period, so too it would seem, the Centre
for Private and Comparative Law will play a major role in contemporary
scholarship. Designed to promote fundamental civil law research and
to generate the doctrinal infrastructure for the new Civil Code, the Centre
has become the focal point for non-pedagogical private law scholarship.
Any evaluation of contemporary scholarship must, therefore, begin with
a review of its work.
To date the Centre has been predominantly pursuing projects in
the mode of analytical scholarship. Some of its initiatives, such as the
publication of an annual edition of the Civil Code hardly qualify as
research scholarship at all. On the other hand, at least four of its efforts,
The Historical and Critical Edition of the Civil Code of 1866,120 the bilingual
compilation of Civil Code terms, 2 , the English/French legal lexicon and
the project to compile a definitive dictionary of civil law terms reasonably
I18 See Janisch, supra, note 110.
119 There is a third reason for the choice of the late 1970s. I myself joined the McGill Faculty
in 1979, and so, from that date onward can speak with first hand knowledge of the Quebec scene.
120 This work, edited by Professors J.E.C. Brierley and P.A. Crdpeau, for which a supplement
has been recently prepared, contains a definitive text (complete with legislative history) of all
amendments to the Civil Code of Lower Canada since 1866.
121 This two volume set, formally titled in English The Key Words in Context of the Civil
Code of Lower Canada (at 1 April 1984) is a bilingual repertory of all uses of legal (and certain
non-legal) terms in the 1966 Civil Code as of April 1, 1984.
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can be characterized as the fruits of fundamental legal research. Each
of these projects involves the investigation and verification of the linguistic
and legislative data of Quebec private law. While none can be labelled
as empirical legal research, all of these publications will be essential
research tools for generations of civil law scholars, and all are the product
of extensive investigation of primary sources.
These tools have also facilitated the Centre's major analytical project,
the sponsorship of a new Civil Law Treatise. No volumes of this work
have yet appeared, but research is underway by seven authors. This
comprehensive treatise deals with the historical, economic, sociological
and philosophical subtext of the Code and will constitute the first
indigenous work of fundamental analytical and conceptual orientation
(that is, will constitute la doctrine) not only in Quebec, but probably
in Canada and will reflect the best to which scholarship in the civil
law can aspire.
The Centre has also undertaken a major empirical inquiry into
medical law, involving the study of medical malpractice in Quebec, its
treatment by the courts and the effects of judicial decisions on medical
procedures. Yet, this latter effort betrays the real irony of much con-
temporary civil law scholarship. In order to be attractive to researchers
and especially to funding agencies, non-analytical, empirical projects seem
to require an extra-codal dimension. It is as if everyone implicitly accepted
that empirical research and the Civil Code were incompatible. Thus,
one finds that instead of empirical analyses of landlord/tenant law, there
are studies of the incidence of compliance with the orders of the Rigie
du logement, rather than economic studies of consumer sales contracts,
there are bureaucratic studies of the Consumer Protection Bureau; instead
of studies of the lease of work (master/servant law), there are studies
of decision making within the Labour Standards Commission. Funding
and prestige rarely accrue to traditional legal analysis, even that of a
fundamental nature, unless some broader dimension, like the possibility
of a treatise, is present.,22
When one examines contemporary civil law scholarship not spon-
sored by the Centre, a familiar picture emerges. Private law scholarship
by established law professors, whether it appears in monographic form
122 Of course, the judgment about whether prestige accrues to those engaged in traditional
research is subjective. Yet my assessment of the reaction of the university community at large
(as opposed to the Bar) to analytical studies is negative. Such a conclusion may also be deduced
from the Annual Reports of the Directors of Quebec's various F.C.A.C.-sponsored Research Centres.
The record of legal scholars before peer review committees of the F.C.A.C. and S.S.H.R.C. is proof
enough of the proposition respecting outside funding, subject to the caveat that both the Bar and
Board of Notaries have contributed substantially to the Civil Law Treatise project.
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or in the law reviews, is still overwhelmingly analytical and expository.23
Nevertheless, in the law reviews especially, some valuable sociological,
historical, comparative and economic studies are appearing.12, Moreover,
historians, sociologists and economists are examining more often the legal
regimes of New France and nineteenth-century Quebec. Even now the
Quiet Revolution is seen as an historical artifact and has generated
academic treatment. While most of these other scholars seem preoccupied
with constitutional law, criminal law, labour law and so on, rather than
with the civil law as reflected in the Civil Code, already they are having
an impact on academic writing within the law faculties.12
Yet, here lies a paradox. It bears notice that the one Quebec law
faculty devoted to interdisciplinary and empirical work, the Universit6
du Quebec h Montrdal, is dominated by public law scholars and little
in the private law field has emerged. Moreover, the one Quebec law
faculty with a commitment to comparative private law, McGill, has had
difficulty in encouraging truly comparative research; it seems that the
common law and the civil law, like Law and Equity, are destined to
flow side by side in the same river bed.,26 In other words, there still
remain significant barriers to the establishment of fundamental private
law research (of either analytical, comparative or empirical orientations)
even within institutions with a particular interest in and commitment
to fundamental research.
Despite this observation, an in-progress summary of patterns in
contemporary private law scholarship in Quebec would certainly not yield
123 In the period 1980-1984 my sampling indicates a general ratio of six analytical studies
to one non-analytical study.
124 See, for example, J.G. Belley, "Vers une sociologie historique de la justice qudbdcoise"
(1983), 24 C. de D. 409; A. Morel, "Canadian Legal History - Retrospect and Prospect" (1983)
21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 159; Normand, supra, note 61; Jobin, supra, note 9; P. Carignan, "La place
faite 4 la religion dans les dcoles publiques par la loi scolaire de 1841" (1982-83) 17 RJ.T. 9;
Gagnon, "Le transfert de ]a propridt6 comme garantie des obligations en droit anglais et en droit
civil" (1982) 13 R.D.U.S. 3; D. LeMay, "Vers un contr6le bibliographique pour les lois du Quebec"
(1983) 24 C. de D. 305; S. Normand, "Justice civile et communaut6 rurale au Quebec, 1880-
1920" (1984) 25 C. de D. 579; and E. Mackaay, "Le droit relatif aux accidents: une interprdtation
6conomique" (1980-81) 15 RJ.T. 383; Boucher, Migu6 & Viens, "Consumer Protection Legislation:
an Exercise in Property Rights Economics" (1983) 13 R.D.U.S. 391.
125 See, notably, the studies by Belley, supra, notes 4 and 114 as concerns sociological work;
the historical studies by A. Morel, ibid., and Normand, ibid; and the economic analysis by Mackaay,
ibid See also P. Desjardins "La Coutume de Paris et la transmission des Terres - le rang de
]a Beauce A Calixa - Lavale de 1730 A 1975" (1980) 34 Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique frangaise
331; J. Dickinson, Justice et Justiciable&- la procidure civile a la privt6 de Quibec, 1667-1759
(1982).
126 The efforts of the University of Ottawa to generate comparative legal scholarship also
should not go unmentioned. From 1963-1975 the Faculty organized Annual Symposia on Com-
parative Law, but this project now seems in abeyance. Similarly, the attempt to produce a comparative
study of private law has been aborted after one volume. See J.A. Clarence-Smith & J. Kerby,
Private Law in Canada - Comparative Studies - General Introduction (1975).
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a pessimistic prognosis. First, it is worth recalling that empirical legal
studies require the coincidence of money, methodology and market. In
recent years the F.C.A.C., aprovincial Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, has sponsored several legal research centres, the McGill
Centre for Private and Comparative Law being the most high-profile
member of this group in civil law matters. Yet, to date, no private sources
seem prepared to fund empirical research, even though the Bar and the
Chamber of Notaries have made significant contributions to the Civil
Law Treatise Project.
Moreover, legal researchers have not developed an adequate me-
thodology either for the design or the execution of empirical studies.
While sociologists, political scientists, economists and social theorists in
Quebec, in greater proportion than their analogues in common law
Canada, seem to be interested in legal phenomena, they apply their own
research tools to the law. Legal scholars thus have an imposing threshold
to traverse: the creation of an indigenous empirical methodology.
Finally, the effect of an absence of market should not be under-
estimated. The profession itself is rarely interested in non-analytical work,
and academic lawyers have not yet succeeded in carving out their niche
as a learned discipline. Neither economic reward, nor personal recognition
accrues to those who pursue empirical or historical work. For this reason,
the gestation period for such scholarship (as a major academic preoc-
cupation) is likely to be another ten to fifteen years. The university tradition
is still in its adolescence in most Quebec law faculties.
The prospects for fundamental analytical research are much better.
The rate of production of such scholarship in monographic form is
extraordinary. The basic bibliographical work has been undertaken and
research tools for exploiting it are now being developed. For example,
there is a project to catalogue and index the Archives of the Civil Code
Revision Office; the Historical Code and the Key Words in Context Index
are already in place; and the Civil Law Dictionary, along with the bilingual
lexicon are well on the way to completion. Finally, the Treatise project
is receiving significant financial support and is progressing on several
fronts. Should this latter project realize the ambitions of its proponents,
it will represent the epitome of la doctrine across the entire range of
private civil law.
The most important development which augurs for the future of
civil law scholarship, however, is a renewed interest in private law among
younger scholars. Many of this new generation have undertaken graduate
study in a foreign country, and bring a more cosmopolitan perspective
to their research. Because they no longer consider themselves to be just
private lawyers or just public lawyers, significant academic cross-
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fertilization is occurring, as they discover the intellectual challenges to
be found in historical, sociological and economic analyses of private
law. Experience elsewhere has shown that there are few better stimuli
to high-quality legal research than inter-generational intellectual con-
flict.127 There is, therefore, cause for real excitement about the future
of fundamental civil law scholarship.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is now appropriate to address explicitly the question why, given
the important theoretical position of analytical studies in the civil law,
fundamental non-empirical scholarship has not yet flourished in Quebec.
Several contributing factors have already been mentioned: the relatively
recent university tradition in law; the small size of the legal academic
community, comprising at most one hundred professors; the deflection
of scholarly energies to the Civil Code Revision Project; the seduction
of public law in the 1960s and 1970s; and the demands of magisterial
pedagogy. Considering these various impediments, it is remarkable that
much research in civil law of any dimension has been generated by
law professors.
Yet there is one other factor which cannot be ignored: the scholarly
tradition in Quebec private law has been harmed by its insularity. In
1985, however, the prognosis is favourable. The broader interests of
younger civil law scholars - in empirical research, comparative law
and historical, economic and sociological analysis - will eventually
transform the agenda for civil law research. If the university tradition
flourishes as one of openness and embrace, the unique features of Quebec's
private law culture, including its bilingual and bisystemic character, will
propel civil law scholarship to the vanguard of twentieth-century Canadian
legal research. In this sense, 'understanding civil law scholarship in Quebec'
means understanding that the historical record of, and immediate prospects
for, fundamental analytical scholarship (/a doctrine) are indeed much
brighter than elsewhere in Canada.
127 The tension between realists and formalists that was played out in the United States in
the 1930s is only the most well known of these controversies. For a civil law perspective see
Atias, "La controverse doctrinale dans le mouvement du droit privd" (1983) 8 R. de la recherche
juridique 427.
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